

This unit is only a brief introduction to the subject of earthquake resistant design of nonbuilding structures. It has been developed by Jim Harris from two primary sources: the content of the *NEHRP Recommended Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings and Other Structures* and two slide collections of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute: the "Annotated Slide Collection" and the "EERI Northridge Earthquake of January 1994 Collection."

The images here are all taken from the 1994 Northridge event: failed transformers in an electric power distribution substation (Sylmar), fire and flood from breaks in buried gas and water mains (Balboa Blvd, Granada Hills), and demolition of damaged highway interchange structures (Gavin Canyon undercrossing, Interstate 5).



There are many issues with nonbuilding structures that are not considered in earthquake engineering for buildings



Left: San Fernando EQ (1971); partial failure of upstream face of lower Van Norman dam, a 40m high earthfill dam about 20 km from epicenter; pga estimated to be 0.3 to 0.5 g; 80,000 people downstream evacuated for several days until water level could be lowered.

Right; Northridge EQ; Pacoima dam, a concrete arch in a rock canyon; used for flood control, thus low water level; measured 2g pga at abutments; extensive rock slides; opened a 2 inch gap at southern thrust block and created several cracks

Issues: liquefaction of hydraulic fills; site conditions; hydrodynamic loads; sloshing



Northridge EQ: Jensen water filtration plant, site of old San Fernando (Van Norman dam) embankment, and new Los Angeles dam above. PGA at Jensen approached 1g at Jenson and were 0.42 g at the abutment of Los Angeles dam. Newer parts of the plant performed quite well, as did the dam

Issues: newer compacted fills/designed dams are vast improvements over hydraulic fills; sloshing, etc.



Left (both): Loma Prieta EQ: Struve Slough bridge (1964, concrete T beam on vertically extended concrete piles, 4 piles per bent)

Right: San Fernando EQ (1971); interchange on San Diego Freeway; failures due to strong ground motions and due to ground failures



Left: Loma Prieta EQ: San Francisco – Oakland Bay bridge, east end of long cantilever truss bridge, small span dropped off seat at expansion joint

Right: Kobe EQ: Nishinomiya Port arch bridge with similar failure; on Kobe-Osaka freeway; evidence of large soil movement at pier

Issues: large displacements of large structures on soft soils



Loma Prieta EQ: Nimitz elevated freeway (I-880, Cyprus viaduct); 50 spans (about 4000 lf) of upper level of two level elevated freeway collapse (out of 124 such spans); 42 fatalities

Issues: very large mass; changes in design considerations over time



Kobe EQ: Hanshin elevated freeway Issues: massive structures, lack of redundancy



Loma Prieta EQ: Nimitz freeway, Oakland

Left: Upper columns on left side had two hinges; on right side had one hinge, thus upper portal was statically determinate, in order to avoid retraint forces from creep of the post-tensioned girder (1954 design)

Center: Upper column on right side had hinge at its base, thus only moment resisting joint was at the top. Failure here was shear capacity at the lower hinge.

Right: Upper column that completely failed at upper joint



Upper left: Northridge EQ; treated water supply tank. Lost contents due to rupture in piping. Also suffered roof damage and elephants foot buckling.

Upper right: Coalinga EQ; thin wall stainless steel tanks; elephant foots buckling at base of tank

Center: Costa Rica EQ, 1991; benzene storage tanks which buckled but did not fail or lose their contents

Lower left: Northridge EQ; firewater tank with base anchor bolts

Issues: fluid-structure interaction; very compression in shell due to vertical cantilever action of tank; mass



Upper left: Spitak, Armenia EQ; horizontal tank on vertical "saddle" walls; wall at one end overturned, dropping the entire tank and tearing out the piping

Lower left: Costa Rica EQ; elevated tank on trussed tower; apparent buckling of legs

Upper right: Manjil, Iran, 1990; empty water storage tank, just constructed; similar full tank completely destroyed

Lower right: Costa Rica EQ 1991; refinery process columns undamaged; designed for hurricane winds

Issues: large mass, little redundancy



Left: No earthquake damage; Trans-Canada gas transmission pipeline; design must account for potential fault displacement, among many other issues

Right: Northridge EQ; Soledad inverted syphon, 120" diameter, 3/8" wall welded steel water supply system carrying water from the Owens Valley system to Southern CA.

Issues: need to resist/accommodate displacements of ground



Right: Kobe EQ: buckling of rails

Center: Northridge EQ; compression failure in 48" water line

Right: Northridge EQ; tension cracks in soil where buried pipe pulled apart; not far from compression photo

Issues: Linear structures must cross zones of likely ground failure; network concepts of system performance are important



Left: Northridge EQ; first observed failure of lattice-type steel transmission line tower; located on a ridge crest and failed due to differential foundation movement; all six conductors snapped, bringing down four adjacent towers

Right: Northridge EQ; Pardee substation; one leg of two legged transmission tower for 220 kV line; 60" square at base, ³/₄" thick plate, sized for stiffness; weld that did not develop strength of plate. Ten such towers were leaning

Lower: Northridge EQ; Pardee substation; porcelain insulator components damaged at 230 kV live tank circuit breakers

Issues: generally low mass; some components inherently brittle; network concepts



The structural design of the excluded items is covered by other well established standards. For example, structural design of highway bridges is covered by the AASHTO *Bridge Design Specification*. Although it was not at the time the Nimitz elevated freeway was designed.



Some nonbuilding structures are quite similar to buildings in their configuration, construction and dynamic behavior. These structures can be designed using the appropriate sections in the body of the NEHRP *Provisions* with exceptions provided in Chapter 14. Nonbuilding structures not similar to buildings require the use of alternative design provisions which are published in industry standards by such organizations as ASCE, ASME, API (American Petroleum Institute), AWWI (American Water Works Institute), and many others. Among the differences between buildings and nonbuilding structures similar to buildings are that partitions and cladding usually add significant damping to buildings. One example of nonbuilding response quite different from buildings is the sloshing of fluids in a tank.



Examples of nonbuilding structures that are considered similar to buildings. The design of steel storage racks should follow the requirements in the RMI design standard, *Specification for the Design, Testing and Utilization of Industrial Steel Storage Racks*. Clearly, damping is not necessarily similar to buildings.



Examples of nonbuilding structures not similar to buildings. Most such structures will be designed according to other standards. The Appendix to Chapter 14 lists many such standards. The *Provisions* provide a few additional requirements for the seismic design of these structures—mostly in the Appendix. The primary issue is that the ground motion and design spectrum are based upon the *Provisions*.



A very brief listing of example design standards. TIA stands for Telecommunications Industry Association. *ASCE 7 Seismic* is the same as *NEHRP*; the use of *ASCE 7* for towers is primarily for wind.



Seismic design requirements and general design rules for nonbuilding structures (Sections 14.1 and 14.2).

For the design of tanks, bins, vessels, etc., it is necessary to include the total weight of all the operating contents when calculating seismic design forces. This is a slight departure from building structures where only a portion (if any) of the live load is considered in the seismic mass.

Drift limitations for nonbuilding structures are waived because damage control of architectural finishes (cladding, windows) is not an issue.

Special analysis techniques to calculate period are required for nonbuilding structures not similar to buildings.



Nonbuilding structures with irregular distribution of mass are good candidates for modal response spectrum analysis. When a nonbuilding structure is supported by another structure, the design procedures are dependent on the relative weight of the non-building structure (W_{nb}) and the supporting structure. If the non-building structure is relatively light the design can follow the rules given in Chapter 6 for components and attachments. If the non-building structure is relatively heavy, the weight and structural system of both structures must be accounted for in the design.



Table 14.2.1.1 lists seismic coefficients and height limitations (by SDC) for a wide variety of nonbuilding structures. Some structural systems are also covered in Table 5.2.2. In general, the limitations on height for a given structural system are not as strict as those for buildings.

Nonbuilding Structures Design Requirements Table 14.2.1.1: Seismic Coefficients and Height Limits					
Structural System	R	Ω_{o}	C_{d}	HL	Х
Steel storage racks	4	2	3½	NL	
Elevated tanks on braced legs	3	2	21⁄2	NL	
Reinf conc tanks (nonsliding base)	2	2	2	NL	
Conc silos, stacksw/ walls to fdn	3	1 ¾	3	NL	
Trussed towers, guyed stacks	3	2	2 1⁄2	NL	
Self-supporting, not covered by other					
standards and not similar to bldgs	1 ¼	2	2 ½	С	
Instructional Material Complementing FEMA 451, Design Examples			n-Building S	systems 15-8	23

A sample of nonbuilding structural systems. Note that for SDC D an intermediate concrete moment frame has a 50 ft. height limitation for nonbuilding structures (Table 14.2.1.1) but for buildings, this structural system is not allowed at all.

Much of this information is changing in the 2003 edition.



The basis for determining importance factors for nonbuilding structures is the same as that for buildings Structures deemed especially hazardous or critical to post earthquake recovery are given a larger importance factor.



'Hazard' in this table is applicable only to tanks and other vessels which may contain materials posing biological, environmental, fire or other risks if these structures should fail. Nonbuilding structures are classified in this table in regards to 'Function'' as either F-I or F-III. F-II is not used.



The design requirements found in the Appendix to Chapter 14 require additional review and support of consensus documents before they can be included in the main body of the chapter.